Taxation Definition, Type and Objectives Of Taxation,

Nigeria's 1999 Constitution and Intergovernmental Relations.
The 1999 constitution metamorphosed from the 1979 Constitution. The Constitution failed to pass through the normal constitutional making process as it was drafted in hurry. General Abdulsalami Abubakar and the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) introduced the Constitution without consulting the opinion of the public. In drafting the Constitution, they had less than six months (November1 1th 1998 - May 5th, 1999) which was too short for a country traumatized and still reeling in uncertainty and fear following the aftermath of the regime of General Abacha. The promulgation of Decree No: 24 titled "Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree 1999" on May 5th, 1999 ushered in the Constitution. The Constitution retained the provisions of the 1979 Constitution with some amendments. It came into force on May 29th, 1999. Regarding IGR, the 1999 Constitution anticipates relationships among 811 govenment units, that is one central government, 36 states and 774 local government (with the inclusion of those at the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Section 7(1) guarantees the system of democratically elected local government but makes it a state responsibility to ensure their existence under a law providing for their establishment, structure, composition and functions.

Roberts (2010) argued that from the viewpoint of constitutional jurisprudence, the important issue is the extent to which constitutional provisions will enhance IGR within the framework of federalism. He further assesses this in respect of the 1999 Constitution using three of the six basic combinations identified in the previous segment. These chosen three according to him are the areas where constitutional provisions defining IGR are considered significant. He lists them as national state local, national state and state local relations. In these Robert's chosen three, major areas where IGR occurs include power relations; revenue allocation; and provision of certain welfare and infrastructural facilities. Regarding allocation of power, the federal government has matters contained in Exclusive Legislative List allocated to it (Second Schedule Part 1); both the federal and state governments have matters allocated to them in the Concurrent Legislative List (Second Schedule, Part I), they include the exclusive functions of a local government council and the participatory state/local government functions (Fourth Schedule). But where there is a conflict between federal and state laws, that of the former takes preference (Section 4(5)); and also where the state executive action clashes with that of the federal, that of the latter supersedes (Section 5(3)). This implies that the federal government can intervene in any matter of public importance if it chooses to do so. It is clear that the constitutional provisions relating to power relations are not likely to enhance IGR as powers are so concentrated at the centre in such a manner capable of turning the states and by extension, the local governments to political simpletons always prostrating for political favours from the centre as 66 specific and 2 omnibus items virtually covering the entire range of public affairs are placed in the Exclusive Legislative List.

In relation to revenue sharing arrangement, the 1999 Constitution stipulates an arrangement that allows for statutory allocation of public revenue from the federation account held at the centre to states and local governments (Section 7(6); 162(1) (8)). T'he federation may also give grants to a state to supplement the revenue of that state with the prescription of the National Assembly; this is called the Federal grants-in-aid (Section 164(1). This fiscal dominance of the federal government is a very great challenge to fiscal federalism. Onimode (2011) refers to this as fiscal unitarism and according to him, it can be adduced to the unified military structure where authority and power are centralized at the top and command and instruction are dictated from top to bottom. With this, it is clear that this dominance will continue to work against the progress and development of the other lower levels of government. In respect to the provision of certain welfare and infrastructural facilities, the different levels of government inter-relate in the pursuit of certain programme of development. With such predominance, the Federal Government could even behave as if it has more stakes in some state than others along political party line (Gboyega, 2009).
The provisions of the 1999 Constitution have in all, emphasized vertical interaction among the three levels of government rather than horizontal relationships. This according to Roberts (2010) could impose limitations to the extent of cooperation among the levels of government and instead promote a dependency structure that would promote the inclusive authority model of IGR. Resistance to the evolution of such structure by sub-national levels of government would result in oppositional politics and negative IGR. Hence, for an improved IGR, some amendments are necessary to Nigeria's 1999 Constitution.

Suggestions for Amendments to the 1999 Constitution to Guarantee an Improved IGR
The suggestions below are proffered towards amendments to the 1999 Constitution to guarantee an IGR that could bring about economic prosperity and social harmony within the Nigerian state:

1. Redistribution of Powers: For an improved IGR to occur in Nigeria, the intergovernmental allocation of powers contained in the second schedule of the 1999 Constitution should be redistributed in favour of the state governments. The federal government's powers should be reduced such that they do not exceed those listed in the 1963 Constitution where its functions were those whose scope of benefits were national like defence, currency, foreign trade etc. By so doing, the states will be allowed a fair and Just exercise of power and control over their resources in exchange for their consent to construct and sustain a united Nigeria (Wayas, 2018).
2. Revenue Allocation Formula: This should be reviewed in favour of the States and local governnment councils. They should be given a larger share of the Federation Account, something in the region of 35 to 40%. Also, the states and the local government councils should adopt a policy of self-sufficiency in resources by exploring and exploiting all available resources that can bring tangible revenues and by managing such resources wisely and in a way that the present trend of heavy dependence of the states and councils on the federal governments could be drastically reduced and reversed.
3. Horizontal IGR: The 1999 Constitution allows room for some inter-state political communication, e.g. through the instrumentality of National Council of State. Yet, it is possible to specify a legislative list of subjects on which states could cooperate (Roberts, 2010). If such function attract grants. Such horizontal IGR would be encouraged. Roberts (2010) further states that account should also be taken of IGR that are at once horizontal and vertical, like the type IGR resultant from the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which involves both the federal government and a number of state governments. Such amendments should be in the second schedule.
4. Local Government Autonomy: The Constitution precludes autonomy for local
government; the reason for this is that all good government is, of necessity local. Nigeria must continue to strive towards effective and virile Local Government. Many of the needed actions may be administrative rather than constitutional. Nevertheless, it is important for the federal government to be able to monitor 1GR at all levels and take or recommend ameliorative action (Roberts, 2010).
5. Council for IGR: In some other federations such as the USA, Australia and India, IGR is monitored by a standing advisory council on IGR. This council recommends improvements where necessary and equally resolves any differences among the levels of government. Such a body known as the National Council on Intergovernmental Relations (NCIR) was established in Nigeria by Decree No. 89 of December 1992 but is was short-lived (Roberts, 2010). The re-establishment of the NCIR as a permanent institution under the Third schedule to the 1999 Constitution is hereby recommended.