Taxation Definition, Type and Objectives Of Taxation,

Operation of the State Joint Local Government Account
To distribute the amount standing in the SJLGA to the local government councils in each state, section 162 (8) of the Constituti on directs that:
The amount standing to the credit of local govemment councils of a state shall be distributed among the local government councils of that State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the state.State Houses of Assembly have passed SJLGA laws to give effect to the above Constitutional provisions, however, evidence has shown that such laws are usually tend to rurther compound the already distressed financial position of local government councils.

This results from various forms of deductions and diversions of funds intended for Local Government, State Governments that are constitutionally required to fund local government councils have instead used the SJLGA mechanism (or Account) to hold local Governments hostage and make them appendages of the state. In practice, the operation of the SJLGA has denied local Government Councils their financial autonomy. It should be noted that the state government is not intended to be a beneficiary of the SJLGA, rather, it is a trustee of the Account. It is required to maintain the Account for the benefit of the local governments by ensuring that the amount allocated for this third tier of government is equitably and fairly shared among the councils, adhering strictly to constitutionally stipulated criteria. However, reports across the country indicate that most state governments are using SJLGA laws contrary to this intention.

Dakwa (2014) has outlined this problem. He states that under the State Joint Local Government Area Distribution and Fiscal Committee Law 2002, a committee was set up to administer the Account. It coprised:

• The Commissioner of the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs (Chairman)
• Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs
• Accountant-General of the State
• All Local Government Councils' Chairmen in the State
• A representative of the Anambra State Primary Education Board
• A representative of the Board of Internal Revenue, and
• The Director of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs (Secretary).

lt should be observed that the key officers of the committee are state government officials and, in the view of this author, the committee was structured from the outset to disadvantage the Local Government Councils (LGCs). Moreover, the Anambra SJLGA Law 2002 empowers the committee to effect the following deductions before distributing funds from the Account to LGCs:

1. 3% of the fund of each council due to the traditional councils
2. 15% of the total personnel emolument of those retired in each council
3. 1% as a training fund
4. 5% of the total allocation of each council as a stabilization account
5. 2 % of the total allocation of each council as an administrative charge
6. 1.5% of the allocation of each council to the department of local government
7. 0.5% of the allocation to the local government audit department.

Thus the state government effectively deducted and diverted funds meant for at of local areas, contributing significantly to the abysmal performance of local governments in providing good governance for the community.

Challenges of State-Joint Local Government Account
The operation of State Joint Local Government Account system as provided by the 1999 Constitution lives much to be desired, as State Government in Nigeria have seen this as an opportunity for manipulating and tampering with the local Government allocations from federation accounts in the name of special deductions in the JAAC system. Instead of acting as a
check to the efficient financial management of Funds accruing to the Local Government councils from Federation Account, they are rather engaging in the deduction of the Local Government Council Funds through their Joint Allocation Account Committee (JAAC) system. Most States Government in Nigeria have resorted to appointing Care-Taker or Transition Committee members into their local government council, thereby negating and contradicting the provision of section 8 of 1999 Federal Republican Constitution of Nigeria which states that, the administration of the councils shall be headed by a democratically elected body, which shall perform the executive and the legislative functions, allotted to the Local Government in the Constitution, for the enhancement of rural development in Nigeria. Thus most Council in Nigeria function as the extension of the Governor's Office in the Local Areas. This is indeed interference in effective running and administration of the Local Government Council as the State Governor's appoints their loyalists and political favourites who sometimes are not good Public Administrators, hence, the poor rural development in Nigeria. This does not guarantee social security which is responsible for the numerous security challenges the Nation is facing at present, because most rural dwellers see governance as a failed Institution, which cannot provide the basic social amenities for the survival of the rural people, despite the huge of fund coming to the States and Local Governments in Nigeria from the Federation Account (Okoye, 2014).
These challenges are summarised as follows:

Challenges of State-Local Government Joint Account
As good as the intention of the joint account system, it is continually hampered with challenges such as:

• Overbearing powers of the state visibly seen in the way and manner the state deducts, diverts and delays the remittance of the money to the local government. In a bid to show the spate of overbearing powers of the state, Aliyu, Afolabi and Akinwande (2013) aver that between 1999 and 2012, there have been accusations against most State Governors that the policy priorities of some of them are sometimes at variance with, and do not always take into consideration the peculiar needs of local governments under them. In a Similar vein, Togun (2010) submits that most governors are not always mindful of the policy focus of local governments because they control the 'purse' of the local councils under them.
• The local governments like the states also follow the pattern of the state by diverting the funds for private use. It is imperative to note that, it is not in all cases that the states do not remit funds to local governments. Though state has been the object of blame and criticism in the operation of the joint account system, but evidence from the documentary analysis of local government monthly allocation records shows that local governments sometimes do divert remaining funds after payment of staff salaries, leaving service provision unattended to. This view had earlier been supported by the work of Ibietan and Ndukwe (2014) who submit that leaders at the grassroots primarily seek means to enrich themselves as quickly as they can and ultimately run the budgets of their various localities aground without any visible developmental projects to show for it. In the same vein, Lawal (2001) reveals that Developmental projects, if any, are in place after being thoroughly inflated.
• The half salary policy of the Osun State Government have further aggravated the problem inherent in the State-Local Joint Account. It has left the account empty as staff was not paid full salary let alone financing the delivery of social service.
• The continual use of the care-taker committee and now council manager have further denied Ife-East Local Government its allocation of funds from the joint account. This system hinders accountability and financial control at the local government level. Analysing the effect of the use of committee system to run local councils, Kunle, (2004), Hickey (1990) contend that the reluctance of State Governors to conduct council polls has been argued elsewhere as a pathway to steal funds. The effect of care-taker committee on state-local joint account is that it prohibits prompt accountability by those in public offices in local government.
• Lastly, the prevalent economic recession that has made most states including Osun State in Nigeria handicapped in paying their staff has also partly affected the smooth operation of the joint account.

Summary of Literature Review
The rural communities or the grassroots were devoid of basic essential services like accessible roads, functioning health centres, clean markets, bore-hole water system, standard refuse disposal system, well built cemeteries, recreational centres etc. The degree of poor service delivery, however, differed from one community to another. The overbearing influence and sharp practices of some of the state governors and corrupt nature of local government leadership in the operation of the joint account system have had considerable adverse effect on service delivery which in the long run underdevelopment rural communities. Against the background of this, we examined the utility of the state-local joint account in stimulating efficient service delivery at the grassroots. It is our contention that if the joint account is enforced according to the purpose for its establishment, it can be very helpful in this direction. Nevertheless, we observed some challenges and proffered solutions to them.

Finally, we have also argued that for an effective and efficient service delivery at the grassroots through monies in the joint account system a multi-pronged approach requiring a combination of factors need to be adopted. To this end, emphasis should be placed more on, creating in the minds of governors and local government chairmen/appointed committee, to sincerely serve the people and not the other way round. And discouraging corrupt practices (diversion, non-remittance of funds, illegal deductions, misappropriation) that are against the purpose of the joint account system, particularly those that are adverse to efficient service delivery and grassroots development.